

4 April 1977

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]  
Office of the Comptroller

25X1 SUBJECT : Suggested Answers to the House Appropriations Committee's  
Follow-up Questions  
[REDACTED]

270-1. We staunchly deny that the conclusions of NIE 11-3/8-76, "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict," were in any way shaped by any political pressures generated as a result of the leak of the conclusions and recommendations of the B Team on Soviet Strategic Objectives. Those changes that were made in the final conclusions of NIE 11-3/8-76 as a result of the experiment in competitive analysis occurred when the B Teams were able to convince the A Teams that attendant uncertainties were such that the A Teams' proposed conclusions went beyond what the evidence would support. The 1976 Estimate took a moderately grimmer view of Soviet intentions. These changes were based on evidence; they would have been made whether or not there had been a B Team. Indeed, all these estimates since 1972 have taken a relatively grimmer view as the evidence on Soviet programs has accumulated.

275. Traditionally, NIEs have been considered the exclusive property of the Executive Branch. Though past DCIs have briefed Congressional committees on the conclusions of these estimates, copies were not turned over to Congress--until the Church Committee's investigation of the CIA. Since the establishment of the Senate Select Committee for Intelligence, Committee staff members have been allowed to read at CIA Headquarters those estimates which have not concerned US policy decisions still under consideration. We have not turned estimates over to the Committee for retention on the Hill. As for the papers the House Appropriations Committee member wishes to see, we will make them available to him on a day by day basis.

276. Admiral Turner has made no final decisions on his future approach to NIEs, but has the matter under active consideration. He has hired a new Deputy, Mr. Robert Bowie of Harvard, to oversee the preparation of these estimates and will wish to hear his recommendations. Admiral Turner is further discussing the question with the members of the National Foreign Intelligence Board to gain their views. Finally, the even larger question of how the Intelligence Community should be organized to produce national intelligence is under discussion in

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the high-ranking group that is preparing the response to Presidential Review Memorandum No. 11 on the Intelligence Community. Once these several discussions have been concluded, Admiral Turner will come back to inform the Congress of his considered approach.



Executive Officer, DCI/NI

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


X - Subject File - House Appropriations Committee w/background material

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Follow-Up Needed -- 31 March 1977  
House Appropriations Committee

<u>Page Number</u>	<u>Subject/Action Needed</u>	<u>Responsible</u>	
225-239	SAFE -- does it need expanding?		25
237	SAFE--need names of people involved in SAFE commonality question. Any schedule?	IC Staff	
243	What guidelines exist on transfer of our technology to other USG agencies?	 (may need to get Commo involved)	25
262	Was there any sort of supergrade study last year?		25
263	Do we want to add any more supergrade argument? Need names and schedule on current supergrade study.		25
270-1	Politicization of estimates. Need to add a few words pointing out change in tone <u>not</u> due to Team B.		✓ 25
275	Get copies of Estimate and Team B report. Check with  and OLC re policy on sharing these with Congress.		✓ 25
276	Kemp questions to Turner on future approach to NIEs		✓ NIOs & IC Staff.
279	Accelleration of DDO reorganization. Need names and dates. Do we want to agree to speed it up?		2
283	Questions on DDO personnel savings. (see also supplemental questions)		

Mr. Kemp. I would like to hear the answer.

Admiral Turner. Very quickly, whether that should be done in the technique of an adversary B Team stacked with one gender of people versus another gender I don't know. That is not my inclination to style. I don't condemn that, and I think there may be occasions when that is desirable.

I would prefer to have a cross section of thinking in the basic group that does the development or that does the review of the development of an estimate, so that it is a balanced product that comes up, with dissenting views contained within it, rather than this polarized adversary position.

*Mr. Kemp*  
Mr. Kemp. Before I yield, and I would be happy to yield to my friend from Missouri, my concern, and there is growing concern among some members of Congress, that that

adversarial process, manifest in the Team A-B

competition, at least presented, whatever faults that may have occurred in that process, it still reflects evidence that the NIE process has been heavily distorted in the past by policy-oriented judgments.

It implies that the NIE's have been politicized to a degree, where its objectivity and balance is questionable, and I would like you to address, insofar as you can, what would be your response to that statement, that some people are convinced that the NIE's have been politicized to a degree where there has not been the balance that you seek to restore to the process.

Admiral Turner. I cannot accept just totally that the process has been politicized. It is my understanding that in the A Team-B Team controversy there was relatively little difference on the facts. The difference is on the interpretation of intent of the Soviets in the future. This

is indeed a murky area, and one in which there is much

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subjective evaluation that must be made.

*Insert?*

My only view to the future is that politicization certainly should not be permitted, and I think the way to prevent it is to <sup>e</sup>insure that the group developing estimates from the beginning has a Catholic viewpoint, a diversity of views contained within it, and if that diversity does not exist in the intelligence community family itself, one must then go and get outside people to review it, being careful to choose from the so-called <sup>e</sup>lift, hawks, doves, and so on.

Mr. Kemp. I yield to Mr. Burlison.

Mr. Burlison. I appreciate my friend from New York yielding.

Admiral, the B Team, I think no one would seriously argue with the fact that the B Team, on this issue was a highly biased team. It seems to me that if you are going to use that type of approach, you have got to also select

a then equally biased on the other side of the issue, if

you are going to get balance, and then use those two biases against the central position which was apparently the in-House, the Administration, the CIA position. ✓

The B Team selection in this instance it seems to me clearly reflected a totally biased and extremist position with respect to the question of intelligence and defense.

I would ask the gentleman to respond to that.

Mr. Kemp. It may be biased. I am not testifying, but it deserves a hearing.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kemp. And that is my only case. It deserves a hearing. We must listen and let people, let the readers, make their own conclusions about whether or not it is extreme. There were some very credible people on the B Team, and it should not be rejected insofar as an attack on it. The B Team did raise some valid and important

issues, so valid and important that I am sure the issues that

(DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PLEASE NOTE: THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS

3/31/77

SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO MR. Kemp AND ANSWERS SUPPLIEDTHEREFO:) *MED 012-77(cc)**questions from Kemp*

Questions for Admiral Turner, Director of CIA

- Answer*
1. Admiral Turner, the recent publicity, unfortunate though it was in many ways, over the report of the so-called "B" Team, did perform a useful function, particularly in raising questions about the methodology employed by CIA in doing their national estimates. The contribution of this effort at "adversary analysis" seems to outweigh its problems. Do you intend to encourage the use of "outside" analysts as "competitors" to Agency analysts in the preparation and analysis of intelligence information?
  2. One of the most persistent criticisms of CIA analysis of Soviet capabilities has been the failure to include the doctrinal context in which Soviet weapons and deployments are necessarily embedded. Will you, as Director, seek to encourage greater attention to the linkages between Soviet political-military doctrine and their weapons developments and deployments?
  3. It has been my experience that a significant amount of "evidence" associated with Soviet developments has a rather ambiguous character because there are important gaps in what we know about the Soviets. As a consequence, the intelligence community, and particularly CIA, is reluctant to "take a position" due to the lack of high quality evidence. As a result, many important developments are either "missed" in that they are not predicted, or the development is "forecast" very late in the day after clear evidence is available. Some critics suggest that a fuller explication of the evidence on important questions, and the implications of that evidence would be helpful. For example, the Committee has been provided with a range of intelligence estimates for the Soviet Backfire bomber that are so wide as to be virtually devoid of content. Yet, a different form of explication of the evidence on Backfire and the areas where different consequences are forecast would permit the Congress to better understand the character of the Soviet program. Similar statements could be made of the Soviet civil defense program and the Soviet ABM research program as well, for example. Do you expect to encourage a fuller presentation of the intelligence data on important areas of Soviet activity that may still be contentious in the intelligence community?



are raised are being discussed in the intelligence community today. I am not suggesting this is the modus operandi for future intelligence estimates, but I am suggesting that there were some valid criticisms of past NIE's to the extent that the Admiral has addressed himself to it. If I am reading too much into your response it seems to me you are saying you would like to encourage an adversarial approach, without making it perhaps as biased as the B Team was.

Is that fair?

Admiral Turner. I would like to say that I want to be sure that adversarial views are reflected in all of our analyses in the development of them. Whether that means polarizing or not, I would reserve judgment on for each individual issue. It would be my inclination not to polarize, but to have a spectrum of views contained within the groups developing the estimate, but I can imagine instances where

you, sir, that there should be a polarization in both directions.

Mr. Mahon. Mr. Director, we have set aside this period for consideration of the budget.

Now all of these questions you are now discussing are material, significant and interesting, but we had planned to close this hearing at noon, and we need to move with our budgetary type investigation, because we are trying to decide how much money we ought to appropriate for the CIA.

Mr. Kemp. In defense of my one question.

Mr. Mahon. I understand that this is pertinent.

Mr. Kemp. I am not saying that you are challenging it.

I just want my colleagues to know that every other witness before this committee always presents in the budget hearings some estimate or guesstimate of the threat, and I think the question goes to the heart of the purpose of the

intelligence estimates, and that is how can we get the best

NIE? What can we do to enhance the process that I think has been encouraged without now addressing the bias of it or anything else, so if the chairman wants, I will submit my questions for the record, but I at some point in this record would like to have an answer not only to the questions, but the Team A and Team B reports, so that we can have an estimate of it, so that we can look at it.

Mr. Mahon. My friend from New York will recall that our first hearing of this subcommittee for the year was an all-day hearing on the degree of the threat.

Mr. Kemp. Yes.

Mr. Mahon. So we do have quite an accumulation.

*Soviet Goals & Objectives*

Mr. Kemp. Again my question is not just the threat.

It is the failure of the intelligence community to adequately address Soviet strategic goals and objectives in recent years, so that is the point to which I have directed my

for the record, and I just want the Director to hear from one member of this committee who is concerned that there is not enough of an adversarial process, again not endorsing the Team B report, but hoping that there is a greater effort in the future to utilize that type of a competitive dialectical, adversarial process.

Admiral Turner: Thank you, sir. I appreciate your views. I would invite your attention to an announcement in the morning newspaper that I have just engaged Professor Robert Bowie of Harvard University to be the Deputy to the Director for National Intelligence Estimates. I picked him precisely because I think he fits the kind of description that you are talking about as a man with a very broad viewpoint, and an ability to bring out divergent views from the people with whom he is working.

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